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Introduction 
Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to 
explaining when and why someone has a justified belief. As it turns out there are a 
number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, 
and in what follows I offer an opinionated survey of several existing options.  
But first, why think knowledge might come first in our account of justification? One 
reason stems from Williamson's (2000) defense of the unanalyzability of knowledge 
together with the E=K thesis, which says that the evidence you possess is just what 
you know. Assuming we should understand justification in terms of evidence, it 
seems to follow that we should understand justification in terms of knowledge.  
A second reason stems from reflections on the normativity of belief. As Williamson 
(2014: 5) reasons: “If justification is the fundamental epistemic norm of belief, and 
  
a belief ought to constitute knowledge, then justification should be understood in 
terms of knowledge too.” Here Williamson is connecting norms for good instances 
of a kind and norms for bringing about instances of that kind. So if one is justified 
in holding a belief only if it’s a good belief, and a good belief is one that constitutes 
knowledge, then it seems to follow that a justified belief has to be understood in 
terms of knowledge (Kelp, et al. 2016; Simion 2019). 
A third reason stems from conceptual relations between knowledge and justification. 
Sutton (2005; 2007) has argued that grasping the concept of epistemic justification 
depends on our prior understanding of knowledge:  
We only understand what it is to be justified in the appropriate sense 
because we understand what it is to know, and can extend the notion of 
justification to non-knowledge only because they are would-be knowers. 
We grasp the circumstances—ordinary rather than extraordinary—in 
which the justified would know. Justification in the relevant sense is 
perhaps a disjunctive concept—it is knowledge or would-be knowledge 
(Sutton 2005: 361). 
Another reason stems from the way in which asymmetries of knowledge can explain 
certain asymmetries of justification. While much of the knowledge-first literature 
on lottery beliefs has focused on assertion (see the entry on knowledge norms), the 
points are easily extended to justification. One cannot have justification to believe 
that (L) one has a losing lottery ticket just on the basis of one's statistical evidence. But 
one can have justification to believe (L) on the basis of a newspaper report. What 
can explain this asymmetry? Knowledge. For one cannot know (L) on the basis of 
statistical evidence, but one can know (L) on the basis a newspaper report. 
Accordingly, knowledge can play a role in explaining the justificatory asymmetry 
involving (L)(Hawthorne 2004; Smithies 2012). A similar asymmetry and 
knowledge-first explanation can be drawn from the literature on pragmatic 
encroachment (Smithies 2012; De Rose 1996). For a further justificatory asymmetry 
that certain knowledge-first approaches to justification can explain involving lottery 
and prefaces cases see Dutant and Littlejohn (2020). 
Further, putting knowledge in the explanatory forefront can explain (broadly) 
Moorean absurdities. Consider, for instance, the absurdity involved in believing p 
while also believing that one doesn't know p. Some explanation for the irrationality 
of this combination of beliefs should fall out of a theory of justification that tells us 
when and why a belief is (or isn't) justified. Theories of justification that explain 
justification in terms of knowledge have an easy time explaining this (Williamson 
2000; 2009; 2014).  
  
Lastly, putting knowledge in the explanatory forefront of justification can explain 
the tight connection between justification and knowledge. For it's widely believed 
that knowing p or being in a position to know p entails that one has justification for 
believing p. One way of explaining this entailment is by saying that knowledge or 
being in a position to know is constitutively required for justification (Sylvan 2018). 
Due to space limitations, I will not pause to explain how each of the following 
knowledge-first theories of justification link up with each of these motivations. But 
in most cases it will be easy to see how they link up.  
1 The Token-Identity Theory 
Perhaps the first knowledge-first theory of justified belief is the token-identity 
theory, according to which token instances of justified belief just are token instances 
of knowledge, which yield the following biconditional (Williamson 2009, 2014; 
Sutton 2005, 2007; Littlejohn 2017: 41-42):  
(J=K) S’s belief that p is justified iff S knows that p.  
As should be clear, this is a theory of a justified act of believing (=doxastic 
justification), not a theory of having justification to believe, whether or not one does 
in fact believe (=propositional justification). But it’s not hard to see how a (J=K) 
theorist might accommodate propositional justification (Silva 2018: 2926):  
(PJ=PK) S has justification to believe p iff S is in a position to know p.  
What does it take to be in a position to know p? One type of characterization takes 
being in a position to know as being in a position where all the non-doxastic 
demands on knowing are met (Smithies 2012; Neta 2017; Rosenkranz 2018; Lord 
2018). The doxastic demands involve believing p in the right kind of way, i.e. the 
kind of way required for knowing. The non-doxastic demands involve the truth of p 
and one's standing in a suitably non-accidental relation to p such that, typically, were 
one to believe p in the right kind of way, one would know. (For alternative 
characterizations of being in a position to know see Williamson 2000: 95; 
Rosenkranz 2007: 70-71.) 
One issue raised by characterizing being in a position to know in counterfactual 
terms concerns what we might call doxastic finks: features of one’s situation that are 
triggered by one’s act of coming to believe p at a time t+1 that would preclude one 
from knowing p despite all the non-doxastic requirements of knowledge being met 
at an earlier time t. For example, I might have all the evidence it could take for 
  
anyone to know p, but suppose Lewis’ (1997) sorcerer doesn’t want me to know p. 
So in all or most nearby worlds when the sorcerer sees me beginning to form the 
belief in p, he dishes out some kind of defeater that prevents me from knowing p. 
So, on standard possible worlds analyses of counterfactuals, it’s false that I have 
some way of coming to believe p such that were I to use it, I would know p (cf. 
Whitcomb 2014). Alternatively, one might seek to characterize being in a position 
to know in terms of having the disposition to know which is compatible with the 
existence of doxastic finks. Another alternative is to give up on the idea that being 
in a position to know is best understood in terms of worlds and situations nearby or 
"close" to one's actual situation, thereby making the target characterization of `being 
in a position to know' a much more idealized notion, one that I’ll discuss below (cf.  
Smithies 2012: 268, 2019: sect 10.4; Rosenkrantz 2018; Chalmers 2012).  
There are various problems with (J=K), and by extension, (PJ=PK).  First, (J=K) is 
incompatible with the fallibility of justification, i.e. the possiblity of having justified false beliefs. 
So (J=K) cannot permit justified false beliefs. But any theory of justification that 
rules out such beliefs is widely seen to be implausible (Bird 2007; Comesana and 
Kantin 2010; Whitcomb 2014; Ichikawa 2014).  
Second, (J=K) is incompatible with the possibility of having a justified true belief in the absence 
of knowledge. Gettier cases are typically cases of justified true belief that do not 
constitute knowledge. But (J=K) implies that there are no such cases because it 
implies that there can be no cases of justification without knowledge. Obviously, 
this bucks against a history of strong intuitions to the contrary (Bird 2007; 
Comesana and Kantin 2010; Whitcomb 2014; Ichikawa 2014).  
Third, (J=K) is incompatible with the new evil demon hypothesis. Consider someone who, 
unwittingly, has had their brain removed, envatted, and is now being stimulated in 
such a way that their life seems to go on as normal. According to the new evil demon 
hypothesis: if in normal circumstances S holds a justified belief that p then S’s 
recently envatted brain-duplicate also holds a justified belief that p. It is beyond the 
scope of this entry to defend the new evil demon hypothesis. But as Neta and 
Pritchard (2007) point out, it is a widely shared intuition in recent epistemology. 
This generates problems for (J=K). For since one cannot know that one is looking 
at a hand (or that a hand is in the room) if one is a recently envatted brain who 
merely seems to be looking at a hand, then according to (J=K) one cannot be 
justified in believing it either (Bird 2007; Ichikawa 2014). (For further discussion 
see the entry on  the new evil demon hypothesis.) 
  
There are further objections to (J=K) that I’ll note below since they apply also to 
alternative knowledge-first theories of justification. I’ll return to discuss the 
standard response to these objections in the final section on excuses below.  
2 Modal Theories 
To avoid the problems with (J=K), some have sought to connect justification and 
knowledge in a less direct way, invoking some modal relation or other.   
Here is Alexander Bird’s (2007) knowledge-first account of justification:  
(JuJu) If in world w1 S has mental states M and then forms a judgment  
[or belief], that judgment [or belief] is justified iff there is some world w2 
where, with the same mental states M, S forms a corresponding judgment 
and that judgment [or belief] yields knowledge. 
(JuJu) counts as a knowledge-first theory of justification because it explains one’s 
justification in terms of the knowledge of one’s mental state duplicates. And it does 
a good deal better than (J=K) when it comes to accounting for justification’s 
intuitive characteristics, including its fallibility, its compatibility with Gettier cases, 
and its compatibility with the new evil demon hypothesis. Despite this, various 
problems have been pointed out concerning (JuJu).  
First, it seems that we can obtain justified false beliefs from justified false beliefs. For example, 
suppose S knew that:  
(a) Hesperus is Venus. 
But, due to some misleading evidence, S had the justified false belief that:  
(b) Hesperus is not Phosphorus. 
Putting these two together S could infer that:  
(c) Phosphorus is not Venus. 
As Ichikawa (2014: 191-192) argues, S could justifiably believe (c) on this inferential 
basis. But, according to (JuJu), S can justifiably believe (c) on the basis of an 
inference from (a) and (b) only if it’s possible for a mental state duplicate of S’s to 
know (c) on this basis. Content externalism, however, precludes such a possibility. 
For content externalism implies that any mental state duplicate of S’s who believes 
(c) on the basis of (a) and (b) will be a thinker for whom the terms ‘Phosphorus’ 
  
and ‘Venus’ refer to the very same astral body, thus making knowledge of (c) on the 
basis of (a) and (b) impossible. Because of this, (JuJu) implies that you cannot have 
justification to believe (c) on this inferential basis, contrary to what seems to be the 
case. This is not just a problem for (JuJu), but also (J=K). 
Second, (JuJu) fails to survive the Williamsonian counterexamples to internalism. 
Williamson’s counterexamples, as McGlynn (2014: 44ff) observes, were not 
intended to undermine (JuJu) but they do so anyway. Here’s one example of the kind 
of case (JuJu) has difficulty with:  
Suppose that it looks and sounds to me as though I see and hear a barking 
dog; I believe that a dog is barking on the basis of the argument ‘That dog 
is barking; therefore, a dog is barking’. Unfortunately, I am the victim of 
an illusion, my demonstrative fails to refer, my premise sentence thereby 
fails to express a proposition, and my lack of a corresponding singular 
belief is a feature of my mental state, according to the content externalist. 
If I rationally believe that a dog is barking, then by [JuJu] someone could 
be in exactly the same mental state as I actually am and know that a dog 
is barking. But that person, too, would lack a singular belief to serve as 
the premise of the inference, and would therefore not know that a dog is 
barking. (Williamson (2000: 57-58). 
McGlynn (2014: 44) draws attention to the fact that a “natural verdict is that one’s 
belief that a dog is barking is rational or justified” despite the fact that one cannot 
know this while having the same mental states. For any (non-factive) mental state 
duplicate will be one for whom the sentence ‘That dog is barking’ cannot be true, 
and hence cannot be known either. So we have another counterexample to (JuJu). 
Again, this is not just a problem for (JuJu), but also (J=K). 
Since (JuJu)’s problems stem from its insistence on sameness of mental states, a 
natural response is to abandon that emphasis and focus on what a thinker and, say, 
her duplicate on Twin Earth can have in common. This is just what Ichikawa (2014: 
189) attempts to do:  
(JPK) S has a justified belief iff S has a possible counterpart, alike to S in 
all relevant intrinsic respects, whose corresponding belief is knowledge. 
The target intrinsic respects are limited to the non-intentional properties that S and 
her Twin Earth duplicate can share. But they are not intended to include all such 
properties. Ichikawa wants to maintain that if, say, S unwittingly lost her body in an 
envattment procedure, she could still have a justified belief that she has a body even 
  
though the only counterparts of hers who could know this are ones who have a body. 
So the target intrinsic respects are to be further restricted to what S and her envatted 
counterpart could share. In the end, this seems to amount to sameness of brain 
states or something close to that. This aspect of (JPK) goes a long way towards 
making it internalist-friendly and also helps (JPK) avoid the difficulties facing (JuJu) 
and (J=K). 
Nevertheless, (JPK) has problems of its own. Both problems stem from the attempt 
to reconcile (JPK) with the idea that justified belief is a type of creditable belief. Here 
is how Ichikawa (2014: 187) describes the first problem. As Zagzebski (1996: 300-
303) and many others have argued, it's plausible that S's holding a justified belief 
entails that S is creditworthy (=praiseworthy) for believing as she does. Moreover, 
S is creditworthy because S holds a justified belief: that is, it is S's particular act of 
believing that explains why S deserves credit. But (JPK) seems forced to explain S 
creditworthiness in terms of facts about a S’s counterparts since it’s one’s counterparts 
that explain one’s doxastic justification. But this seems odd: why facts about a 
merely possible, distinct individual make me creditworthy for believing as I actually 
do?  As others have pointed out, this can seem odd (Silva 2017). But a more 
promising response involves noting that having a justified belief immediately 
grounds being creditworthy for believing, just as our intuition has it. And facts about 
one's counterparts' knowledge immediately grounds having a justified belief. But 
immediate grounding is not transitive, so stuff about knowledge does not 
immediately ground being creditworthy for believing. So, the odd consequence does 
not follow. A consequence that does follow is that stuff about knowledge mediately 
grounds being creditworthy for believing. (Because there’s a chain of immediate 
grounds connecting these.) But here it’s open for the knowledge-firster to say that 
our intuition really concerns only immediate grounding.  
Ichikawa is clear that (JPK) is a theory of justified belief (=doxastic justification) 
and that this is the notion of justification that is connected to a believing being 
creditworthy. But doxastic justification has a basing requirement, and this makes 
doxastic justification partly a historical matter. And epistemic credit and blame also 
seem to depend on historical factors too (Greco 2014).  Thus, Ichikawa’s defense of 
(JPK) is susceptible to cases like the following:  
Bad Past: At t S comes to believe that there is a ceiling overhead. S believes 
this because she just took a pill which she knew would induce random 
changes in her intrinsic states. In advance of taking the pill, S knew it 
would very likely cause her to have many false perceptual beliefs. But as 
it happens, the pill induced a total re-organization of her intrinsic states 
such that at t S has a counterpart who knows a ceiling is overhead. 
  
(JPK) implies that S has a justified belief in Bad Past because she happens to have a 
knowledgeable counterpart. And because she has a justified belief she is also 
creditworthy. But this seems wrong. Rather, S seems positively blameworthy for 
believing as she does. (See Silva (2017) for further discussion of (JuJu) and (JPK) 
and see Greco (2014) for further discussion of historical defeaters for doxastic 
justification.) 
An alternative solution to these problems would be to revise (JPK) so that's it’s only 
a theory about propositional justification:  
(PJPK) S has justification to hold a belief iff S has a possible counterpart, 
alike to S in all relevant intrinsic respects, whose corresponding belief is 
knowledge. 
One could then, arguably, concoct a knowledge-first theory of doxastic justification 
by adding some kind of historical condition that rules out cases like Bad Past.  
It should be noted that (PJPK) has a strange result. For if your intrinsic counterpart 
knows p, then your intrinsic counterpart believes p. But if your intrinsic counterpart 
believes p, then you also believe p (cf. Whitcomb 2014). So if (PJPK) is true, you only 
have propositional justification to believe p if you actually believe p. But it’s usually 
assumed that it’s possible to have justification to believe p even if you don’t believe 
p. To accommodate this (PJPK) will need revision. 
3 Reasons-First, Knowledge-First Theories 
Sylvan (2018), and Lord (2018) each take a reasons-first approach to justification, 
on which justified belief just is belief that is held for sufficient reason:  
(J=SR) S’s belief that p is justified iff S possess sufficient reason to believe 
p, and S believes that p for the right reasons. 
While (J=SR) is not itself a knowledge-first view of justification, it can become one 
if combined with a knowledge-first account of what it takes to possess reasons. Lord 
(2018: ch3) and Sylvan (2018: 212) both do this, taking reasons to be facts and 
arguing that one possesses a fact just in case one is in a position to know it:  
(Pos=PK) S possess the fact that p iff S is in a position to know that p. 
Others have argued for some kind of restriction on (Pos=PK). For example, Neta 
(2017) has argued that our evidence is the set of propositions we are in a position 
  
to know non-inferentially. Provided one’s evidence just is the set of reasons one has 
for belief, this view will fall into the reasons-first, knowledge-first camp. (For 
objections to (Pos=PK) see Kiesewetter (2017: 200-201, 208-209) and Silva 
(2020).) 
Perhaps surprisingly, the category of reasons-first, knowledge-first views cross-cuts 
some of the other categories. For example, (J=K) theorists have tended to fall into 
this camp. Williamson (2009) and Littlejohn (2018) take one’s evidence to consist 
of the propositions that one knows. Provided one’s evidence just is the set of reasons 
one has for belief, this leads to a view on which one possess p iff one knows p. This 
more restrictive knowledge-first view of possession together with (J=SR) and (J=K) 
constitute a kind of reasons-first, knowledge-first theory of justification. Since 
justified belief that p and knowledge that p never separate on this view it can seem 
hardly worth mentioning this view as a reasons-first view. But there is more in need 
of epistemic justification than belief (though that will not be discussed here). There 
are other doxastic attitudes (e.g. suspension, credence, acceptance, faith) as well as 
actions and feelings that are in need of epistemic justification, and on knowledge-
first reasons first views these states can only be justified by one’s knowledge. For 
another example of this taxonomic overlap see my discussion of Millar’s (2019) 
virtue theory below. 
As mentioned above (J=K) is subject to a range of objections. So in what follows I’ll 
focus on Lord and Sylvan’s incarnation of the knowledge-first program that consists 
of (J=SR) and (Pos=PK). These two principles give us a knowledge-first theory of 
justification that avoids some of the main problems facing (J=K).  
First, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with the existence of justified false beliefs. This is 
due to the fact that one’s reasons (the facts one is in a position to know) can provide 
one with sufficient, yet non-conclusive, reason to believe further propositions that 
may be false. The fact that a drunk has always lied about being sober, can be a 
sufficient yet non-conclusive inductive reason to believe that he will lie about being 
sober in the future. Since it's non-conclusive, having justification for this belief is 
consistent with it turning out to be false. So this view can allow for justified yet false 
inferential beliefs. We’ll discuss the possibility of justified false perceptual beliefs 
below in connection with the new evil demon hypothesis.  
Second, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with the existence of Gettier cases: cases of 
unknown, justified true beliefs. Because Smith can have justified false beliefs in the way 
described above, he can have a justified false belief that Jones will get the job based 
on the fact that the employer said so and the fact that this is a highly reliable 
indicator of who will get the job. Smith may also know that Jones has ten coins in 
  
his pocket based on perception. So, through an appropriate inferential process, 
Smith can come by a justified true inferential belief that the person who will get the 
job has ten coins in his pocket. This is a Gettier case, i.e. an instance of an justified 
true belief without knowledge.  
A few caveats. First, it's worth noting that the reasons-first, knowledge-first theory 
of justification only has this implication under the assumption that the justificatory 
support one derives from facts one is in a position to know is transitive, or can at 
least sometimes carry over inferences from premises that one is not in a position to 
know. For, here, Smith's false belief that Jones will get the job is justified by the 
reasons Smith is in a position to know, and we're assuming this justified false belief–
which Smith is not in a position to know–can nevertheless facilitate Smith's ability to 
acquire inferential justification for believing that the person who will get the job has 
ten coins in his pocket. For worries about the non-transitivity of the justification 
relation see Silins (2007) and Roche and Shogenji (2014). 
Second, it's also worth noting that while Lord and Sylvan’s view is consistent with 
some  intuitions about Gettier cases, it is not consistent with all such intuitions. 
After all, their view seems to be that we possess different reasons/evidence in the 
Gettier cases than we do in the good cases. This will seem counterintuitive to those 
who think that it’s obvious that we have the same evidence in both cases.  
Third, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with some intuitions about the new evil demon 
hypothesis. In the standard telling, the recently envatted brain has a non-veridical 
perceptual experience as of p and believes p on the basis of that non-veridical 
experience. While the non-veridical experience does not give one access to the fact 
that p (if it is a fact) there is an inferential process that can give the envatted brain a 
justified belief according to (J=SR) and (Pos=PK). This is because mature thinkers 
who are recently envatted can know (or be in a position to know) that in the past 
their visual experiences have been a reliable guide to reality, and can sometimes 
know that they are now having an experience as of p. Together, these are facts that 
can give one sufficient reason to believe p even if one is an unwittingly recently 
envatted brain.  
Of course, the weakness here is that the envatted brain's perceptual belief that p is 
not based on her inferential source of propositional justification to believe p. Rather, 
the envatted brain holds her belief in response to her perceptual experience. So she 
is not doxastically justified, i.e. her belief itself fails to be justified. So there is some 
bullet to bite unless, perhaps, one can argue that knowledge of the fact that one is 
having an experience as of p can itself be a reason to believe p even when one is an 
unwittingly envatted brain. 
  
There are further problems that the reasons-first, knowledge-first view faces. They 
are along the lines of the problems for Bird's (JuJu). For if reasons are facts, then one 
cannot obtain justified false beliefs from justified false premise beliefs unless, as 
noted above, one's justified false premise beliefs are themselves inferentially justified 
and justificatory support carries over (see the discussion of (JuJu) above).  Similarly, 
it's unclear whether one can gain justified beliefs from contentless beliefs. For 
contentless "premise" beliefs do not stand in inferential relations to their 
"conclusions" and such relations seem essential to the ability of justificatory support 
to transmit across inferences.  
For a further concern about this view see Littlejohn’s (2019) “Being More Realistic 
About Reasons”, where he argues that the conjunction of (J=SR) and (Pos=K) 
generates explanatory lacunas regarding how reasons should constrain our 
credences. 
4 Perspectival Theories 
Perspectival knowledge-first theories of justification put "knowledge first" by letting 
one’s point of view on whether one has knowledge determine whether one has 
justification. Smithies’ (2012) for example argues that:  
(PJ=PJK) S has justification to believe that p iff S has justification to 
believe that she is in a position to know that p.  
Smithies (2012: 268) treats being in a position to know as a matter of being in a 
position where all the non-psychological conditions for knowing are met. Smithies 
is clear that this is only a theory of propositional justification (=having justification 
to believe), not doxastic justification (=having a justified belief). For as a theory of 
doxasitc justification it would be too demanding: it would require an infinite 
hierarchy of beliefs and it would require that one have epistemic concepts 
(KNOWLDGE, JUSTIFICATION, POSITION TO KNOW) if one is to have any 
justified beliefs at all. This would over-intellectualize justification, excluding agents 
incapable of epistemic reflection (e.g. young children, hanidcapped, smart non-
humans). Worse, if knowledge requires justification then this would also rob such 
beings of knowledge.  
It's important to note that (PJ=PJK is neutral on which side of the bi-conditional 
gets explanatory priority. To be a genuinely knowledge-first view it must be the 
condition on the right-hand side that explains why the condition on the left-hand 
side obtains. This is something that Smithies himself rejects.  And there are good 
reasons for this as there are objections to (PJ=PJK) that emerge only if we give the 
  
right-hand side explanatory priority. But there is also a general objection to this view 
that is independent of which side gets priority. I’ll start with the general objection 
and then turn to the others. 
A central worry to have about (PJ=PJK), irrespective of which side gets explanatory 
priority, is the extent to which Smithies' purely non-psychological conception of 
propositional justification is a theoretically valuable conception of justification as 
opposed to a theoretically valuable conception of evidential support. For it is obvious 
that our evidence can support propositions in virtue of entailment and probabilistic 
relations, where these propositions can be so complex as to be well-beyond our 
psychological abilities to grasp. For example, even before I had the concept GETTIER 
CASE my evidence supported the claim that I exist or I'm in a Gettier case just in virtue 
of the fact that I exist was already part of my evidence and entailed that disjunction. 
But since I did not have the concept GETTIER CASE, I could not form that belief.  
So one general question concerns whether the motivations appealed to in support of 
(PJ=PJK) wrongly identify the following two epistemic notions:  
Evidential Support. Having evidence that entails or probabilistically 
supports p.  
Justification. Having evidence that gives one justification to believe p.  
Certain evidentialists will like the idea of binding these notions together, thinking 
that strong evidential support is all there is to epistemic justification (Smithies 
2019). Yet many have objected to the kind of evidentialism implicit in making 
evidential support necessary and sufficient for justification. The necessity direction 
has been objected to due to lottery problems, pragmatic encroachment, and the 
existence of justified beliefs not derived from evidence (so called "basic" or 
"immediate" or "foundational" justification). The sufficiency direction, while rarely 
challenged, is also objectionable (Silva 2018). For example, some mental states are 
such that we're not in a position to know that we're in them even upon reflection 
(Williamson 2000). Suppose you knew that you just took a pill that ensured that 
you're in a mental state M iff you don't believe (A) that you're in M. A rational response 
to this knowledge would be to suspend belief in (A) due to your knowledge of this 
biconiditonal: for if you believe (A) then it’s false, and if you disbelieve (A) then it’s 
true. So suspension seems like the only rational response available to you. In at least 
some such cases where you've consciously suspend belief in (A), you will also know 
that you've suspended belief (A). This is at least a metaphysical possibility, and 
certainly a logical possibility. Now, since you know the biconditional and since you 
know you've suspended belief in (A), your evidence entails that you're in M. But it is 
  
logically impossible for you to justifiedly believe or know (A) on your evidence–and 
you can know this a priori. For believing (A) on your evidence entails that (A) is 
false. So connecting justification to evidential support in this way is inconsistent 
with the following plausible idea: S has justification to believe P on E only if it's 
logically possible for S to justifiedly believe P on E. (For further discussion of these 
and related reasons to separate justification from evidential support see Silva (2018); 
for further objections to Smithies see Smith 2012; for further defense of Smithies' 
theory see Smithies (2019: sect 9.4).)  
Further, as Smith (2012) pointed out, (PJ=PJPK) implies that having justification 
to believe p requires having justification to believe an infinite hierarchy of meta-
justificatory claims:  
One thing that we can immediately observe is that [PJ=PJK]…is recursive, 
in that it can be reapplied to the results of previous applications. If one 
has justification to believe that p (Jp) then, by [PJ=PJK], one must have 
justification to believe that one is in a position to know that p (JKp). But 
if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that p 
(JKp) then, by [PJ=PJK], one must have justification to believe that one 
is in a position to know that one is in a position to know that p (JKKp) 
and so on... In general, we have it that JpÉ JKn p for any positive integer 
n. 
If one adds to this the priority claim that having justification to believe that one is 
in a position to know p is the source of one’s justification to believe p, one must either 
accept a skeptical result due to grounding worries about the infinite hierarchy of 
meta-justificatory claims, or accept a knowledge-first form of infinitism. But even 
overcoming the standard general worries with infinitism, knowledge-first infinitism 
will be especially difficult to handle in light luminous KK failures. For example, in 
Williamson’s (2000: 229) unmarked clock case, one is argued to know a proposition 
p, while also knowing that it’s very improbable that one knows p. Intuitively, this is 
a case where one knows p and so justifiedly believes p even though they lack 
justification to believe they know p. (For a discussion of the limits of the unmarked 
clock case see Horowitz 2014.) 
The final issue with (PJ=PJPK), is whether or not having justification to believe that 
one is in a position to know is the source of one’s propositional justification to believe 
p (which would make this a knowledge-first view) or whether it is a non-explanatory 
necessary and sufficient condition on having justification to believe p (Smithies’ view). 
To illustrate the difference. Supposing God exists it’s certainly true that: Paul is 
5’11’’ at t if and only if God knows that Paul is 5’11’’ at t. But the right-hand-side of 
  
that biconditional is non-explanatory. God’s knowing this doesn’t make or otherwise 
explain Paul’s height. Now, if the advocate of (PJ=PJPK) holds that having 
justification to believe that one is in a position to know is the source of one’s 
justification, then having a doxastically justified belief will, according to tradition, 
require one to base their belief that p on that source of justification. But ordinarily 
we do not base our beliefs on further facts about knowing or being in a position to 
know. So if we’re not to risk an unacceptable skepticism about doxastically justified 
belief (and hence knowledge), it seems we’ll either have to give up the tradition or 
treat the right-hand-side of (PJ=PJPK) as specifying a mere non-explanatory 
necessary and sufficient condition. But if that’s the case it can seem puzzling why 
there should be such a modally robust connection between justification and one’s 
perspective on whether one knows.  
A view much like (PJ=PJPK) that avoids all but this final problem is a thesis 
discussed by Dutant and Littlejohn (2020):  
(Probable Knowledge) It is rational for S to believe p iff the probability that S 
is in a position to know p is sufficiently high. 
There are very general questions about this thesis I haven’t the space to discuss, e.g. 
what is the relevant notion of 'in a position to know' and the relevant notion of 
'probability' (objective, subjective, epistemic), and  what counts as one’s evidence? 
Even after those issues are settled, provided we can and should distinguish between 
propositionally and doxastically rational belief, it seems that (Probable Knowledge) 
is either not going to be held as a genuinely knowledge-first view because priority is 
given to its left-hand side or, it is going to be held as such a view but it will not allow 
for enough doxastically rational beliefs due to the basing worry described above for 
(PJ=PJPK). 
Reynolds (2013) has offered a related view of doxastic justification on which 
justified belief is the appearance of knowledge: “I believe with justification that I am 
currently working on this paper if and only if there has been an appearance to me of 
my knowing that I am currently working on this paper.” Generalizing this we get:  
(J=AK) S’s belief that p is justified iff S is appeared to as though S knows 
that p. 
On his view appearances are not doxastic states nor are they conceptually 
demanding. As he explains the target notion:  
  
Consider the following example: Walking in a park I notice an unfamiliar 
bird, and decide I would like to find out what it is. Fortunately it doesn’t 
immediately fly away, so I observe it for two or three minutes. A few 
hours later, having returned home, I look up a web site, find a few photos, 
follow up by watching a video, and conclude confidently that I saw a 
Steller’s Jay. I think it is perfectly correct to say that the bird I saw had 
the appearance of a Steller’s Jay, even though I didn’t know that that’s 
what it was at the time. If it hadn’t had the appearance of a Steller’s Jay, I 
wouldn’t have been able to remember that appearance later and match it 
to the photos and video of Steller’s Jays. I didn’t have the concept of a 
Steller’s Jay, yet I had an appearance of a Steller’s Jay. 
(J=AK) has advantages vis-à-vis (PJ=PJK). It doesn’t lead to an infinite hierarchy of 
meta-justificatory claims and it’s not hard to see how many of our occurrent beliefs 
might be based on such appearances thereby avoiding some of the skeptical 
challenges that threatened (PJ=PJK). But there are problems. 
One concern with (J=AK) is its self-reflective character. To have a justified belief 
you have to be (or have been) in a state in which it appears to you as though you have 
knowledge. This requires introspective abilities, which arguably some knowing 
creatures might lack. As Dretske (2009) liked to put it: a dog can know where its 
bowl is, and a cat can know where the mouse ran. The correctness of these and other 
knowledge ascriptions doesn’t seem to turn on whether or not dogs and cats have 
the capacity to access their own mental lives in such a way that they can appear to 
themselves to have knowledge.  
Moreover, (J=AK) implies that every justified belief is a belief with such an 
appearance. But many of the justified beliefs we form and much of the knowledge 
we acquire is merely dispositional–i.e. it involves dispositional beliefs that are never 
or only very briefly made occurrent. Do we, as a matter of psychological fact, also 
have the appearance of knowledge with regard to all such states? There is non-trivial 
empirical reason to find this suspicious. In the psychology of memory it has been 
observed that our memory systems are not purely preservative, they are also 
constructive. For example, our subpersonal memory systems often lead us to forget 
very specific beliefs while forming new beliefs that are more general in character. 
Sometimes this leads to new knowledge and new justified beliefs (Grundmann and 
Bernecker 2019). But if the new belief is the product of subpersonal operations and 
the more general belief is itself un-retrieved, then it’s unclear how that more general 
unretrieved justified belief could appear to oneself as a case of knowing. 
  
A final concern with (J=AK) is its ability to handle undercutting defeat and the 
plausible idea that beliefs can cognitively penetrate appearances (see the entry on 
cognitive penetration). For suppose you have strong undefeated evidence that you’re 
in fake barn county, but you brazenly believe without justification that you’re looking 
at the one real barn in all the county. Perhaps this is because you pathologically 
believe in your own good fortune. But pathology is not necessary to make the point, 
as it is often assumed that we can have unjustified beliefs that we believe to be 
justified. If either is your situation, your belief that you’re looking at a real barn can 
appear to you to be knowledge given your normal visual experience and the fact that 
you (unjustifiedly) believe your defeater to have been defeated. According to (J=AK) 
your belief is then justified. But that’s the wrong result. Unjustified beliefs that 
enable the appearance of knowledge should not have the ability to neutralize 
defeaters.  
Here is a final perspectival, knowledge-first theory of justification. It is mentioned 
by Smithies (2012) and explored by Rosenkranz (2018): 
(J=¬K¬K): S has justification to believe p iff S is not in a position to 
know that S is not in a position to know that p.  
Like Smithies, Rosenkranz relies on a conception of justification and being in a 
position to know that is psychologically undemanding. But unlike Smithies, 
Rosenkranz explicitly regards his view as about justification for idealized agents and 
leaves open what relevance this notion has for ordinary, non-idealized agents like 
us.   
There are at least two concerns with this view of justification. First, suppose we were 
to treat (J=¬K¬K) as a theory of justification for ordinary non-ideal agents and 
imposed (as many wish to) substantive psychological limits on what one has 
justification to believe. With such limits in place, (J=¬K¬K) would face not an over-
intellectualization, problem but an under-intellectualization problem. For agents 
who lack the concept KNOWLEDGE or the complicated concept POSITION TO 
KNOW could never be in a position to know that they're not in a position to know. 
So such agents would be justified in believing anything.  
But even once psychological limits are stripped away, and with them the under-
intellectualization problem, another problem remains. Smithies (2012: 270) points 
out that on this view to lack justification one must be in a position to know that one's 
not in a position to know. Since being in a position to know is factive this limits 
defeating information to factive defeating information. But it seems like misleading 
(non-factive) information can also defeat knowledge and justification. For example, 
  
suppose you're told that you're in fake-barn country. But in fact you’re not, so you're not 
in a position to know that you’re in fake-barn country. Still, the misleading 
testimony that you are in fake-barn country gives you justification to believe that 
you are in fake-barn country. Intuitively, this misleading testimony will defeat your 
justification to believe that there is a barn ahead; the misleading testimony ensures 
you shouldn’t believe that. But you’re not in a position to know that you’re not in a 
position to know that there is a barn ahead–recall the testimony you receive is 
misleading. So (J=¬K¬K) says you have justification when intuitively you do not. 
In response, it seems open to advocates of (J=¬K¬K) to argue that while one might 
not be in a position to know the content of the misleading testimony (because it's 
false), the misleading testimony itself can defeat. In this case, for example, it's 
arguable that the misleading testimony that one is in circumstances that make one's 
knowing that p improbable itself defeats one's being in a position to know p, and so 
prevents one's good visual contact with an actual nearby barn in normal conditions 
from putting one in position to know that a barn is nearby. (However, recent 
arguments for the existence of "unreasonable knowledge"–i.e. knowledge that p 
while knowing that it's improbable that one knows p–will challenge the integrity of 
this response in defense of (J=¬K¬K). For more on unreasonable knowledge see 
Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014) and Benton and Baker-Hytch (2015).) 
5 Virtue Theories 
We are not simply retainers of propositional knowledge. We are also able to acquire 
it. You are, for example, able to figure out whether your bathroom faucet is currently 
leaking, you are able to figure out whether your favorite sports team won more 
games this season than last season, you are able to figure out the sum of 294 and 
3342, and so on. In normal circumstances when you exercise this ability you gain 
propositional knowledge. If you are able to figure out whether the faucet is leaking 
and you use that ability, the typical result will be knowledge that the faucet is leaking 
(if it is leaking) or knowledge that the faucet is not leaking (if it is not leaking). The 
core idea behind knowledge-first virtue epistemology (KFVE) is that justified belief 
is belief that is somehow connected to exercises of the ability to know. Predictably, 
(KFVE)-theorists have had different things to say about how justified belief is 
connected to this ability. (For opposition to the idea that the ability to know could 
be necessary for knowing, and hence for justified belief, see Hirvelä (2019).) 
5.1 Infallibilist Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology 
According to Millar (2019), we cannot exercise an ability to know without thereby 
acquiring knowledge. That is: 
  
(Exercise Infallibilism) S’s belief is the product of an exercise of an ability to 
know only if S’s belief constitutes knowledge.  
It’s not only the case, on Millar’s view, that exercises of abilities to know produce 
knowledge, they also produce beliefs that are reasons-responsive. That is:  
(Reasons-Responsive) If S’s belief that p is the product of an exercise of an 
ability to know, then S’s belief is responsive to the fact that p.  
While much of Millar’s work on justification is focused on “well-founded belief”–
which is an accessiblist notion of justified belief–he is happy to concede that there 
is a notion of justified or rational belief that an agent has in virtue of believing p in 
a reasons-responsive way (Millar 2019: 110).  
While Millar’s view is distinctive in various ways, it notably inherits all of (J=K)’s 
problems.  For (Exercise Infallibilism) entails that when it comes to basic perceptual 
justification one’s perceptual belief that p is justified only if one knows that p. So 
Millar’s account of perceptual justification will be unable to accommodate the 
following insights (assumptions) about justification:  
Desideratum 1. Justification is non-factive, i.e. one can have justified false 
beliefs.  
Desideratum 2. One can have justified true beliefs that don’t constitute 
knowledge, as in standard Gettier cases.  
Desideratum 3. One can have justified perceptual beliefs even if one is in an 
environment where perceptual knowledge is impossible due to systematically 
misleading features of one’s perceptual environment. This can happen on a 
more global scale (as in the new evil demon case), and it can happen on a 
more local scale (as in beech-elm cases discussed below).  
5.2 Proficiency-Theoretic Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology 
The central point of departure from Millar’s virtue theory and the remaining virtue 
theories is that they reject (Exercise Infallibilism). It’s this rejection that makes the 
resulting theories resilient to the objections facing (J=K). On Miracchi’s (2015) 
preferred instance of (KFVE), exercises of abilities to know explain our justified 
beliefs but it is not mere abilities to know that have the potential yield justified 
beliefs. Rather, it is only proficient abilities to know (“competences”) that yield 
justified beliefs. One has a proficient ability to know just in case an exercise of their 
  
ability to know ensures a sufficiently high objective probability of knowing. That is, 
the conditional objective probability that S knows p given that S exercised a relevant 
ability to know is sufficiently high. This is a kind of in situ reliability demand on 
justification. 
We can summarize her view of justified belief, roughly, as follows: 
(KFVE-Proficiency) S has a justified belief iff S’s belief is competent, where S’s 
belief is competent iff S’s belief is produced by an exercise of a proficient ability 
to know.  
Central to her view is the idea that exercises of abilities, even proficient abilities, are 
fallible, i.e. an agent can exercise an ability to know without succeeding in knowing. 
So (Exercise Infallibilism) is given up. This enables (KFVE-Proficiency) to 
accommodate justified false beliefs (i.e. Desideratum 1) as well as justified true 
beliefs that don’t constitute knowledge (i.e. Desideratum 2). So (KFVE-Proficiency) 
avoids two of the main challenges to (J=K) and Millar’s (KFVE-Infallibilism).  
However, by limiting justified beliefs to beliefs produced by proficient abilities, 
Miracchi’s view is, like (J=K) and Millar’s infallibilist view, unable to accommodate 
Desideratum 3, i.e. the compatibility of justified beliefs formed in certain deceptive 
environments. The first case of this is just the familiar new evil demon case. For the 
recently envatted brain, as Kelp (2016; 2017; 2018) argues, retains the ability to 
know by perception that, say, they have hands by responding to visual appearances 
in normal circumstances. But because they are no longer in normal circumstances 
they no longer possess a proficient ability to know. In other words, the recently 
envatted brain’s change of environment robs them of the proficiency needed to form 
justified beliefs.  
Miracchi (2020) rejects, or is at least deeply suspicious of, the metaphysical 
possibility of the new evil demon hypothesis. But we needn’t rely on fantastical brain 
evattment scenarios to make this style of objection to (KFVE-Proficiency). Suppose 
you grew up in an environment with lots of beech trees and developed the ability to 
visually identify them and thus the ability to know that a beech tree is nearby by 
sight. Since exercises of abilities are fallible, you could exercise this beech-
identification ability if you were to unwittingly end up in another environment 
where there are only elms (which, according to Putnam, look indistinguishable from 
beeches to the untrained). But this is not an environment where your ability to 
identify beeches amounts to a proficiency: conditional on your exercise of your 
ability to identify and come to know that beeches are nearby, it is objectively highly 
likely that you will fail to know. So the intuition that you can have justified 
  
perceptual beliefs about beeches being nearby in such a case appears inconsistent 
with (KFVE-Proficiency). While there may be some doubt about the metaphysical 
possibility of the new evil demon hypothesis, this is a perfectly possible scenario. 
See Kelp (2018: 92) for a similar objection for Miracchi. 
One last concern with (KFVE-Proficiency) regards its ability to accommodate defeat. 
I discuss this in the section below. 
5.3 Ability-Theoretic & Functionalist Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology 
Kelp (2016; 2017; 2018) and Simion (2019) offer versions of (KFVE) that do not tie 
justification so closely to in situ reliability and thereby avoid not only the problem of 
having justified false beliefs and the possibility of gettier cases, but also problems 
arising from the new evil demon hypothesis and very local cases of deception (like 
the beech-elm case above). So Desiderata 1-3 are easily managed. I’ll first explain 
their views and then mention some concerns they share.  
On Kelp’s (2016; 2017; 2019) view, justified belief is competent belief, and 
competent beliefs are generated by exercises of an agent’s ability to know. 
Importantly, such exercises don’t require proficiency in Miracchi’s sense. On 
Simion’s (2019) view justified beliefs are beliefs that are generated by properly 
functioning cognitive processes that are aimed at yielding knowledge. Like the 
exercise of abilities, cognitive processes can properly function without proficiency. 
We can provide a rough summary of the type of view that Kelp and Simion endorse:   
(KFVE-Ability) S has a justified belief iff S’s belief is competent, where S’s 
belief is competent iff S’s belief is produced by an exercise of an ability to know. 
(KFVE-Functionalism) S’s belief is justified iff S’s belief is produced by a 
properly functioning cognitive process that has the etiological function of 
generating knowledge. 
These are relatively coarse-grained principles and Kelp and Simion defend more 
refined theses. Kelp and Simion’s views are not unrelated to each other. For the 
ability to know is an ability one has in virtue of having certain belief-producing 
cognitive processes, and Kelp’s (2018) preferred account of how the ability to know 
is acquired is the same general kind of account that Simion (2019) relies on in 
arguing that the cognitive processes that constitute one’s ability to know are 
cognitive processes whose function is knowledge production. Nevertheless, the 
views are distinct in that (KFVE-Ability) grounds justification in agent abilities, 
  
while (KFVE-Functionalism) grounds them in cognitive processes. See Kelp (2019) 
for a discussion of the importance of this difference. 
Central to their views is the idea that exercises of abilities to know are fallible, and 
given the fallibility of exercises of the ability to know (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-
Functionalism) allow for justified false beliefs and justified true beliefs that don’t 
constitute knowledge. So Desiderata 1 and 2 are easily accommodated.  
Desiderata 3 is likewise easily accommodated. In Kelp’s (2018) telling, the recently 
envatted brain retains and exercises an ability to know when believing she has a 
hand upon having the visual experience as of a hand. According to Simion (2019), 
just as an envatted heart pumping orange juice counts as a properly functioning heart  
a recently envatted brain counts as properly functioning when it comes to believe it 
has a hand upon having the visual experience as of a hand. And if justified belief can 
be had in cases of such systematic perceptual deception, then they can also be had 
in cases of localized perceptual deception as in the beech-elm scenario above. 
So (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) can accommodate Desiderata 1-3. 
What about the desiderata that emerged in the objections to (JuJu), (JPK), and 
reasons-first, knowledge-first views? That is:   
Desideratum 4. Justified beliefs can be based on inferences from justified false 
beliefs.  
Desideratum 5. Justified beliefs can be based on "inferences" from contentless 
beliefs. 
Desideratum 6. Justified belief is a kind of creditable belief.  
Desideratum 7. Justified belief has a historical dimension that is incompatible 
with situations like Bad Past.   
If (KFVE-Ability) or (KFVE-Functionalism) imply that a recently envatted brain is 
able to have justified beliefs from an exercise of an ability to know or as a product 
of their cognitive competences which aim a knowledge, then it’s easy to see how 
claims 4 and 5 will be verified by (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism). For 
these seem like more local cases of deception. As for 6 and 7, the virtue-theoretic 
machinery here is key. For both can be explained by the demand that justified beliefs 
are beliefs that issue from an ability or a properly functioning cognitive process. But 
that was exactly what was lacking in the cases discussed above that motivated 6 and 
  
7. (See Silva (2017) for an extended discussion of how certain versions of KFVE can 
satisfy these desiderata.) 
There are some worries about these versions of (KFVE). Consider Schroeder’s 
(2015) discussion about defeater pairing. Any objective condition, d, which defeats 
knowledge that p is such that: if one justifiedly believes that d obtains then this 
justified belief will defeat one’s justification to believe p. For example, suppose you 
formed the belief that a wall is red from an ability to know this by perception and 
that you’re in normal circumstances where the wall is in fact red. You will have a 
justified belief according to each of the fallibilist versions of (KFVE) above. But 
suppose you were given misleading yet apparently reliable undercutting information 
that the wall is illuminated by red lights and so might not actually be red. This is 
not true, but were it true it would defeat your knowledge; were it true you would be 
in a Gettier situation. Now the defeater pairing insight says that the fact that you 
justifiedly believe the wall is illuminated by red lights defeats your justification to 
believe the wall is red. But according to the fallibilist instances of (KFVE) discussed 
above, since you arrived at your belief that the wall is red through an exercise of your 
proficiency (/ ability/ properly functioning cognitive process) you have a justified 
belief according to (KFVE-Proficency), (KFVE-Competence), and (KFVE-
Functionalism). But that’s inconsistent with the intuition that the justification for 
your belief is defeated. 
So this objection gives rise to a further potential demand on an adequate theory of 
justified belief:  
Desideratum 8. Justified belief is susceptible to defeat by justified defeating 
information.  
(For resistance to defeater pairing see putative cases of "unreasonable justified 
beliefs" where S arrives at a justified belief (and perhaps knowledge), but also knows 
that it's improbable that she has knowledge in her circumstances (Lasonen-Aarnio 
2010, 2014; Benton and Baker-Hytch 2015. See Horowitz (2014) for critical 
discussion of such cases and defense of the idea that justification is inconsistent with 
certain kinds of negative higher-order information.) 
The second concern to have about (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) is that 
there is a question about the extent to which abilities/cognitive processes are “in 
the head”. For example, consider the amputee gymnast. She lost her leg and so no 
longer has the ability to do a backflip. So her ability to do backflips is located not 
just in her head, it’s also located in her ability to successfully interact with the 
physical world in some ways. In this case, it’s located in her ability to control her 
  
body’s physical movements in certain ways. This doesn’t conflate proficiency with 
mere ability, for even with both legs the gymnast might not have a proficiency 
because she’s in an inhospitable environment for performing backflips (high winds, 
buckling floors, etc.). We might wonder, then, whether the recently envatted brain’s 
ability to know by perception is lost with the loss of its body and the body’s perceptual 
apparatus just as the gymnast’s ability to do backflips is lost with the loss of her leg. 
If so, then it’s a mistake to think (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) are 
compatible with the new evil demon hypothesis (Desideratum 3). This threatens to 
make these views much more revisionary than they initially appeared to be.  
5.4 Know-How Theories and the No-Defeat Condition 
Silva (2017) argues that justification is grounded in our practical knowledge 
(knowledge-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-
that). The motivation for this incarnation of (KFVE) starts with the simple 
observation that we know how to acquire propositional knowledge. You, for example, 
know how to figure out whether your bathroom faucet is currently leaking, you know 
how to figure out whether your favorite sports team won more games this season 
than last season, you know how to figure out the sum of 294 and 3342, and so on. In 
normal circumstances when you exercise such know-how you typically gain 
propositional knowledge. If you know how to figure out whether the faucet is leaking 
and you use that know-how, the typical result will be knowledge that the faucet is 
leaking (if it is leaking) or knowledge that the faucet is not leaking (if it is not leaking). 
One way of thinking about the grounds of justification is that it is crucially connected 
to this kind of know-how: justified belief is, roughly, belief produced by one's 
knowledge how to acquire propositional knowledge.  
Here's a rough characterization of Silva’s (2017) view: 
(KFVE-Know How) S has a justified belief iff (i) S’s belief is produced by an 
exercise of S’s knowledge how to gain propositional knowledge, and (ii) S is 
not justified in thinking she is not in a position to acquire propositional 
knowledge in her current circumstances. 
One advantage of (KFVE-Know How) is that  it is formulated in terms of know-how 
and so avoids worries about abilities not being “in the head”. For example, while 
the amputee gymnast discussed above lacks the ability to perform backflips she still 
knows how to do them. Similarly, in thinking about the recently envatted brain, she 
still knows how to acquire propositional knowledge by perception even if she lacks 
the ability to do so because she has lost the necessary perceptual apparatus. So 
  
Desideratum 3 is, arguably, easier to accommodate on (KFVE-Know How) than on 
(KFVE-Ability).  
 
Similarly, since exercises of know-how are fallible in situ (Hawley 2003), (KFVE-
Know How) has no trouble explaining how exercises of one’s knowledge how to 
know could lead one to have a false belief (Desideratum 1) or have true beliefs that 
don’t constitute knowledge (Desideratum 2). For similar reasons (KFVE-Know 
How) is able to satisfy Desiderata 4-7. See Silva (2017) for detailed discussion of 
these points.   
 
Lastly, condition (ii) is a kind of “no defeater” condition that makes (KFVE-Know 
How) compatible with Schroeder’s defeater-pairing thesis and standard intuitions 
about undercutting defeat. So it manages to accommodate Desideratum 8. (In 
principle, each of the fallibilist instances of (KFVE) above could be augmented with 
condition (ii) in order to accommodate Desideratum 8.) So (KFVE-Know How) 
appears capable of satisfying all the desiderata that emerged above.  
6 Excused Belief vs Justified Belief 
The objections to knowledge-first views of justification above assumed, among 
some other things, that justification has the following properties: 
Desideratum 1. Justification is non-factive, i.e. one can have justified false 
beliefs.  
Desideratum 2. One can have justified true beliefs that don’t constitute 
knowledge, as in standard Gettier cases.  
Desideratum 3. One can have justified perceptual beliefs even if one is in an 
environment where perceptual knowledge is impossible due to systematically 
misleading features of one’s perceptual environment. This can happen on a 
more global scale (as in the new evil demon case), and it can happen on a 
more local scale (as in beech-elm cases discussed above).  
Desideratum 4. Justified beliefs can be based on inferences from justified false 
beliefs.  
Desideratum 5. Justified beliefs can be based on "inferences" from contentless 
beliefs. 
Desideratum 6. Justified belief is a kind of creditable belief.  
  
Desideratum 7. Justified belief has a historical dimension that is incompatible 
with situations like Bad Past.   
Desideratum 8. Justified belief is susceptible to defeat by justified defeating 
information.  
Knowledge-first virtue epistemology has the easiest time accommodating these 
assumed properties of justification, with (KFVE-Know How) being able to 
accommodate all of them. In defense of alternative knowledge-first views some 
might argue that 1-8 (or some subset thereof) are not genuine properties of 
justification, but rather properties of a kindred notion: excuse. As Littlejohn (2012: 
ch. 6; 2020) and later Williamson (2014: 5; 2020) argued, the failure to properly 
distinguish justification from excuses undermines many of the arguments that 
object to there being a tight connection between knowledge and justification. An 
excuse renders you blameless in violating some norm, and it's easy to see how some 
might argue that 1-8 (or some subset thereof) indicate situations in which an agent 
is excusable, and so blameless, although her belief is not justified.   
Arguably, the most accommodating knowledge-first virtue theories threaten to make 
the concept of an excuse nearly inapplicable in epistemology. For the situations 
indicated in 1-8 are so inclusive that it can be hard to see what work is left for 
excuses. If one thought there should be deep parallels between epistemology and 
moral theory, which leaves substantive work for excuses, then one might worry that 
holding on to all of Desiderata 1-8 conflates properties of justification with 
properties of excuse. For recent exploration of the role excuses can play in defending 
knowledge-first accounts of justification see Williamson (2020) and Littlejohn 
(2020). For, perhaps, the locus classicus on the concept of excuse see Austin's "A Plea 
for Excuses".  
7 A Methodological Reflection on Gettierology vs. Knowledge-
Centrology 
After about forty years of unsuccessful work trying to give a reductive account of 
knowledge in terms of justification many judged it to be a degenerating research 
program. In putting knowledge first in the theory of justification, these 
epistemologists are exploring whether we can more successfully reverse the order of 
explanation by giving an account of justification in terms of knowledge. If you’ve 
read this far you will have noticed that we’re around twenty years into putting 
knowledge first in the theory of justification and problems are still being worked out 
in a way that is reminiscent the history of attempts to solve the Gettier problem. 
  
Perhaps this warrants a return to the tradition from which knowledge-first 
epistemology sprang. Alternatively, perhaps this merits a further departure from 
both. For more on such methodological reflections see Whitcomb (2014) and 
(Gerken 2017). 
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